This paper presents a stress-testing model for liquidity risks of banks. It takes into account the first and second round (feedback) effects of shocks, induced by reactions of heterogeneous banks, and reputation effects. The impact on liquidity buffers and the probability of a liquidity shortfall is simulated by a Monte Carlo approach. An application to Dutch banks illustrates that the second round effects in specific scenarios could have more impact than the first round effects and hit all types of banks, indicative of systemic risk. This lends support policy initiatives to enhance banks' liquidity buffers and liquidity risk management, which could also contribute to prevent financial stability risks.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has underscored the need to explicitly take into account liquidity risk in stress-testing frameworks. The manifestation of liquidity risk can rapidly move the system into the tail of the loss distribution through bank runs, the drying up of market liquidity or doubts of counterparties about banks' liquidity conditions. In these situations liquidity can evaporate, making a bank subject to multiple possible equilibria with very different levels of liquidity supply (Banque de France, 2008) .
Liquidity risk is not only a source of banks' funding risk (the ability to raise cash to fund the assets), but also has a strong link to market liquidity (the ability to convert assets into cash at a given price).
The originate-to-distribute model has made banks increasingly dependent on market liquidity to secure funding by issuing securities on wholesale markets and by trading credits. As a result, banks have become more vulnerable to macroeconomic and financial shocks that may engender liquidity risk.
Various regulatory initiatives in response to the credit crisis have highlighted that banks' stress-testing practices usually do not incorporate liquidity risk scenarios sufficiently (FSF, 2008) .
Banks often underestimate the severity of market-wide stress, such as the disruption of several key funding markets simultaneously (e.g. repo and securitisation markets). Moreover, banks do not systematically consider second-order effects that can amplify losses. These can be caused by idiosyncratic reputation effects and/or collective responses of market participants, leading to disturbing (endogenous) effects on markets. Banks have insufficient incentives to insure themselves against such risks (FSA, 2007) . This is because holding liquidity buffers is costly and may create a competitive disadvantage. Besides, liquidity stresses have a very low probability and market participants could have the perception that central banks will intervene to provide liquidity in stressed markets.
Macro stress-testing, i.e. testing the financial system as a whole, is an instrument of central banks and supervisory authorities to assess the impact of market-wide scenarios and possible second round effects. Such tests with regard to liquidity risk can enhance the insight in the systemic dimensions of liquidity risk. These exercises can also contribute to market participants' awareness of systemic risks. However, liquidity risk is not included in most macro stress-testing models. A main reason for this is that the multiple dimensions of liquidity risk make quantification difficult (IMF, 2008) . This could also explain the large variation in the extent to which supervisors prescribe limits on liquidity risk and insurance that banks should hold (BCBS, 2008) . This paper presents a stress-testing model which focuses on both market and funding liquidity risk of banks. Multiple dimensions of liquidity risk are combined into a quantitative measure. Section 2 describes related models by reviewing the literature. Section 3 outlines the model framework of Liquidity Stress-Tester and explains the model structure for the first and second round effects of shocks to banks' liquidity. It also provides a parameter sensitivity analysis Section 4 presents model simulations for Dutch banks as an illustration, including an anecdotal back test. Section 5 concludes.
Literature
Our study relates to models of financial intermediation by banks in transmitting and amplifying shocks. For instance, liquidity risk plays a role in the interaction and contagion between banks in the interbank market. Upper (2006) presents a survey of interbank contagion models, concentrating on interbank loans. This channel of contagion is operative when banks become insolvent due to defaults by their (interbank) counterparties. Contagion may also take the form of deposit withdrawals due to fears that banks will not be able to meet their liabilities because of losses incurred on their (interbank) exposures. Upper sees scope for improvements in the specification of the scenarios leading to contagion. He concludes that a fundamental shortcoming is the absence of behavioural foundations of the interbank contagion models, which results in the assumption that banks do not react to shocks (i.e. absence of optimising banks). Adrian and Shin (2008) add to this that domino models do not take sufficient account of how prices change. Related to interbank contagion studies is literature that analyses payment and settlement systems as a potential source of liquidity shocks and contagion between banks (see for instance Leinonen and Soramäki, 2005) . Some studies in this field also pay attention to behavioural reactions (e.g. Bech et al, 2007 , Ledruth, 2007 .
Recent work provides some more guidance on how micro foundations could be introduced into financial sector models. The model of Goodhart et al (2006) is based on both heterogeneous banks and households (investors) and operates through endogenous feedback mechanisms, both amongst banks, investors and between the real and financial sectors. Liquidity indirectly plays a role through the credit supply of banks to other banks and consumers, while default is endogenous within the system. A drawback of their model is the simplification of the economy to only banks and consumers.
Furthermore, the authors recognise the challenge of their approach to reflect reality. Aspachs et al (2006) have calibrated the Goodhart model to values of several banking systems by using the probability of default of banks as a measure of financial fragility.
Another strand of models links the banking sector to asset markets, which differs from earlier studies that view liquidity shortages as stemming from the bank's liability side, due to depositor runs (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000) or withdrawals of interbank deposits (Freixas et al, 2000) . Goetz von Peter (2004) relates banks and asset prices in a simple monetary macroeconomic model in which asset prices affect the banking system indirectly through debtors' defaults. Asset price movements that are driven by market liquidity can also lead to endogenous changes in banks' balance sheets through a financial accelerator (Adrian and Shin, 2007) . Cifuentes et al (2005) examine how defaults across the interbank network are amplified by asset price effects. Herein, market liquidity drives the market value of banks' assets which in a downturn can induce sales of assets, depressing prices and inducing further sales. Nier et al (2008) apply the same mechanism to an interbank network in which contagion is dependent on the connectivity, concentration and tiering in the banking sector. In this framework the default dynamics with liquidity effects are simulated, including second round defaults of banks. These result from shocks to the assets of banks, rather than to the liabilities. The model of Diamond and Rajan (2005) also focuses on the bank's asset side and shows that a shrinking common pool of liquidity exacerbates aggregate liquidity shortages. Boss et al (2006) have developed a system in which models for market and credit risk are brought together and connected to an interbank network module. This is similar to the framework developed by Alessandri et al (2008) , which also takes into account asset-side feedbacks induced by behavioural responses of heterogeneous banks. These two models are used for stress-testing by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of England, respectively. Off-balance contingencies are not covered in these models. Feedback effects arising from market and funding liquidity risk are also (still) missing in most macro stress-testing models of central banks. Such effects are featuring in models with margin constrained traders, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) . They model two 'liquidity spirals', one in which market illiquidity increases funding constraints through higher margins and one in which shocks to traders funding contributes to market illiquidity due to reduced trading positions.
Our approach relates to the last strand of work, but while the study of Brunnermeier and Pedersen is mainly conceptual in nature, our model is based on a more mechanical algorithm to make it operational for simulations with real data. In this respect, Liquidity Stress-Tester belongs to the class of simulation models of central banks that are used to quantify the impact of shocks on the stability of the financial system. The value added of our approach is the focus on the liquidity risk of banks, taking into account the first and second round (feedback) effects of shocks, including price effects on markets, induced by behavioural reactions of heterogeneous banks and idiosyncratic reputation effects.
The model centres on the liquidity position of banks and their related risk management reactions. The contagion channels through which the banks are affected (e.g. the interbank network, asset markets) are not explicitly modelled. Instead, contagion results from the effects of banks' reactions on prices and volumes in the markets where other banks are exposed to, as described in the next section.
Model

Framework
In stylised form the Liquidity Stress-Tester model can be represented by Figure 1a . Banks' liquidity positions are modelled in three stages; after the first round effects of a scenario, after the mitigating actions of the banks and after the second round effects. In each stage, the model generates distributions of liquidity buffers by bank, including tail outcomes and probabilities of a liquidity shortfall. The model is driven by Monte Carlo simulations of univariate shocks to market and funding liquidity risk factors which are combined into a multifactor scenario. For instance, a credit market scenario can be assumed to include rising credit spreads, falling market prices of structured credit securities (market liquidity) and reduced liquidity in the primary markets for debt issues (funding liquidity). The model is flexible to choose any plausible set of shock events. This deterministic approach of scenario building is based on economic judgement and historical experiences of confluences of events that are likely to lead to a banking liquidity crisis. In the model the scenario horizon is set at one month but the model is flexible to extend it (as an example, section 4.2 presents outcomes at a horizon of 6 months).
A scenario is uniformly applied to individual banks by weighting the banks' liquid asset and liability items (i) that would be affected by the scenario with stress weights (w i ). For instance, in case of the credit market scenario, weights would be attached to banks' tradable credit portfolios, collateral values and wholesale funding liabilities. The weights (w i ) stand for haircuts in the case of liquid assets (reflecting reduced liquidity values or mark-to-market losses) and run-off rates in the case of liabilities (reflecting the drying up of funding). The size of the weights w i differs per balance sheet item according to the varying sensitivity of assets and liabilities to liquidity stress (see section 3.2).
In the model, a scenario is assumed to unroll in two rounds. In the first round the initial effects of shocks to banks' market and funding liquidity risks are modelled (stage 1 of the model, represented by the first line of the flow chart in Figure 1a ). This is done by multiplying the liquid asset and liability items that are affected in the first round of the scenario by the stress weights (w i ). The resulting loss of liquidity is then subtracted from a banks' initial liquidity buffer. The outcome is given The systemic second round effects embody contagion within the banking sector as well as interactions between markets and banks. The contagion results from the effects of banks' reactions on the prices and volumes in the markets where the banking sector is exposed to (possible market stress caused by other developments is included in the model as an exogenous variable). For instance if banks would react to restore their liquidity position by cutting credit lines to other banks, which could be a defined reaction in the scenario, the banking sector experiences reduced funding liquidity in the interbank market (this type of second round effect is depicted in the upper left panel of Figure 1b ). In the model, the effect on interbank exposures does not operate directly through mutual balance sheet linkages as in traditional interbank contagion models, but indirectly through a reduced liquidity in the interbank market as a whole (reflected in a stress weight (w i ) applied to interbank liabilities). This is assumed to be an aggregate effect; the model does not specify whether it relates to increased borrowing rates or reduced credit supply. The same applies to contagion through interlinkages between markets and banks. For instance, if banks would react to restore their liquidity position by fire sales of stock portfolios, which could be a reaction defined in the scenario, the banking sector as a whole is affected by reduced mark-to-market values of stocks. This shows up in a stress weight (w i ) applied to the stock portfolios of banks (this type of second round effect is depicted in the upper right panel of Figure 1b ). Possible interactions between market and funding liquidity, as explored in IMF (2008) , are also taken into account in the model framework. For example, funding pressures due to margin calls may lead to reduced liquidity provision by banks to investors. This will strain the trading activity on financial markets and give rise to falling market prices, affecting the banks with exposures to the pressed tradable securities. In the model this is accounted for by applying a stress weights (w i ) to the affected securities holdings of the banks (see lower left panel of Figure 1b ). Contagion can also run from liquidity shocks on markets to funding liquidity, as depicted in the lower right panel of Figure   1b . This could be the case if banks are forced to sell tradable securities in response to an initial shock, engendering falling market prices and reduced collateral values. The latter will strain the funding possibilities of banks in the repo market. In the model this is reflected in a stress weight (w i ) applied to repo funding lines. 
Figure 1B, Systemic effects through contagion channels
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Data
While Liquidity Stress-Tester is a top-down model, it is run with bank level data. In case of the Dutch banks, we use the liquidity positions (both liquid stocks or non-calendar items and cash flows or calendar items) that are available from DNB's liquidity report on a monthly basis. Data include on and off-balance sheet items. As baseline, the model assumes a going concern situation, as reflected in unweighted liquid assets and liabilities. This assumes that liabilities can be fully refinanced and that the liquidity value of assets is 100%., i.e. the weights (w i ) are 0.
The weights are taken from DNB's liquidity report in which they are fixed values (DNB, 2003) . In the report, the actual liquidity of a bank must exceed the required liquidity, at both a one week and a one month horizon. By this, the report tends to focus not only on the very short term, but also on the more structural liquidity position of banks. In the report, actual liquidity is defined as the stock of liquid assets (weighted for haircuts) and the recognised cash inflow (weighted for their liquidity value) during the test period. Required liquidity is defined as the assumed calls on contingent liquidity lines, assumed withdrawals of deposits, drying up of wholesale funding and liabilities due to derivatives. In this way, the liquidity report comprises a combined stock and cash flow approach. The weights (w i ) applied to the liquid assets and liabilities in the DNB report represent a mix of a firm specific and market wide scenario and are based on best practices and values of haircuts on liquid assets and withdrawal or run-off rates of liabilities typically used by the industry and rating agencies (see Table A in the Annex) 1 . This makes them a useful point of departure for our model. The parameterisation of the run-off rates, either based on best practices or historic data, is a weakness in most liquidity stress-testing models of banks. This is because data of stress situations are scarcely available and in times of stress the assumed elasticities may behave differently. As a consequence, banks' may underestimate the stability of their funding base. By applying a stochastic approach, Liquidity Stress-Tester takes into account this uncertainty of the model parameters.
First round effects
In Liquidity Stress-Tester the fixed weights of DNB's liquidity report are assumed to be 0.1% tail events 2 (w i ≈ 3 x σ). The scenario impact of the first round effect on an item i is determined by simulated weights (w_sim 1,i ). These are based on Monte Carlo simulations by taking random draws from a normal distribution N (0,1), that is scaled by (w i / 3). The scaled normal distribution is then transformed to a log-normal distribution by Exp (N (0,1) * (wi / 3))
The use of a log-normal distribution is motivated by the typical non-linear features of extreme liquidity stress events. The log-normal distribution, which is skewed to the right, captures this feature.
Its asymmetric shape fits well on financial market data in particular in high volatility regimes. For that reason the log-normality of asset returns plays an important role in theory of risk management and asset pricing models. Besides, the log-normal distribution is bounded below by 0 which is also due for 1 In the model, the weights of DNB's liquidity report that apply to a horizon of 1 month are used. The liquidity model of Standard & Poor's (2007) is based on a standard set of assumptions, i.e. a spectrum of asset haircuts and liability run-off rates, that were established after a review of bank balance sheets, industry, S&P data and dialogue with risk managers. 2 In the model simulations this assumption could be changed according to other insights. 3 This transformation is based on the fact that if X ~ N (μ,σ 2 ) is a normal distribution then Exp (X) ~ Log-N (μ,σ 2 ).
the simulated weights in our model. As an upper bound, the weights are truncated at w_sim 1,i ≤ 100 in the simulations, since haircuts and withdrawal rates can not exceed 100%. This procedure delivers a log-normal distribution of weights which is bounded below by 0 and truncated at the top by 100. The liquidity buffer in the baseline situation (normal market conditions), B 0 , is
b being the individual bank and I non-cal, i the amount of available assets of non-calendar items (the stock items of liquid assets 1 .. nc). By this, the buffer is made up by deposits at the central bank, securities that can be turned into cash at short notice, ECB eligible collateral, interbank assets available on demand and receivables from other professional money market players available on demand. B 0 provides counterbalancing capacity to liquidity scenarios in which liquidity values of the stock of assets could decline and a drain of liquidity could occur due to decreasing net outflows of liquidity.
This means that the scenario effects could be felt through both deteriorating liquid stocks and flows.
The first round effect (E 1 ) of the scenario is determined by,
I i being the amount of all liquid (non-calendar and calendar) asset and liability items. The liquidity buffer after the first round impact of the scenario, B 1, is,
Banks' response to scenario (mitigating actions)
Banks that are affected seriously by the first round effects of the scenario are assumed to react to restore their liquidity buffer to the initial level (B 0 ). Banks may take actions to safeguard their stability and/or to meet liquidity risk criteria of supervisors and rating agencies. In the model, the trigger for a bank's reaction is a decline of its original liquidity buffer that exceeds a threshold θ. By this, reactions are triggered by a significantly large impact of the first round of the scenario (as reflected in the simulated buffer B 1 ). The trigger q (0, 1) is based on a probability condition (probit),
The latent variable θ can be seen as a 'rule measure' which banks follow due to self imposed liquidity risk controls or regulatory requirements. The rule is operationalised by assuming that large value change of balance sheet items reflect banks' intentional responses to a buffer decline. The rule variable θ can then be derived from the average correlation between value changes of balance sheet items and declines of liquidity buffers one month lagged: 4 Table 1 shows that only substantial declines of the liquidity buffer (from 40%) lead to significant changes of balance sheet items in the next period. This only indicates whether a bank would react and not the direction of the response. 5 Smaller declines are probably (passively) absorbed by the buffers of the banks. Based on this outcome, a rule variable θ equal to 40% is used as a uniform trigger for each banks' reaction. The type of instruments (items i, amounting I) which banks use to react is specified beforehand in the design of the second round of the scenario, based on judgement of the set of instruments that will most likely be used in a particular scenario. For instance banks can use securities eligible for repo with central banks, draw on liquidity lines from other banks, sell liquid securities, such as government bonds or asset backed securities, or rely on unsecured funding in the (money) markets. The choice of instruments may be determined by internal rules or contingency funding plans that sometimes 4 The assumption that the change of I i reflects balance sheet adjustments is quite strong as changes of I i could also be caused by exogenous price movements. However, very large changes of I i are more likely to be caused by portfolio adjustments since extreme price effects on a 1 month period of time can be considered quite rare. Moreover, banks do not value all the balance sheet items on a mark-to-market basis. B t=0 ≠ B 0 and B t=1 ≠ B 1 , as the former are the actual monthly buffers, whereas the latter are the buffer in each stage of the model simulations. 5 Hence the sign of the correlation coefficients can not be interpreted straightforward since the value of items can either increase or decrease in reaction to declines of the buffer, depending on the type of crisis, the nature of the balance sheet item and the response of the individual bank. For instance, to generate liquidity a bank can either sell tradable securities (value of asset item decreases) or issue additional securities (value of liability item increases), or substitute some assets of liabilities with other items. with B 2 > B 1, but B 2 < B 0 , since the buffer can not be fully restored due to the market disturbances in the first round of the scenario (as reflected in w_sim 1,i ). In an extreme stress situation, financial markets may be gridlocked completely due to the drying up of liquidity. Such an extreme case is represented by w_sim 1,i = 100, implying that banks have no possibility to enter a particular market segment to raise additional liquidity. In the case of the repo markets this could mean that certain collateral of banks may be useless.
Second round effects
The behavioural reactions of the banks can have wider disturbing (endogenous) effects on markets, feeding back on the banks. This will be manifested in additional haircuts on liquid assets and ). In the case of deep and liquid 6 The model does not specify the conditions (e.g. credit spreads) at which funding is attracted.
markets (e.g. the government bond market) where discretionary transactions will have little effects, w_sim 2,i is smaller than in the case of illiquid market segments. Such differences will already be reflected in w_sim 1,i from which w_sim 2,i is derived, 7 By running Liquidity Stress-tester with a limited sample of banks (in this paper the Dutch banks) it is implicitly assumed that the reactions of this sample are representative for the (global) banking system as a whole.
In the model, the market conditions contribute to the severity of the second round effects: the higher s, ) and the level of market stress (s).
It is assumed that the similarity of reactions has a stronger effect on markets than the number of reacting banks (see the exponential relationship in Figure 3b ). The intuition behind is that the similarity of reactions points to crowded trades in markets which cause a drying up of market liquidity.
Banks that react in order to restore their liquidity buffer face a reputation risk in the financial markets.
While applying sensible measures ought to strengthen a banks' financial position and comfort counterparties, the adverse signalling effect of the transactions could reverberate on the conditions that banks face in the markets. This could translate in even more (idiosyncratic) haircuts on liquid assets and withdrawals of liquid liabilities, as reflected in w_sim* 2,i (with w_sim 2,i ≤ w_sim* 2,i ≤ 100). The reputation effect will be dependent on the market conditions (s) driving the second round effects, since particularly in stressed circumstances the signalling effect of reactions will adversely feedback on a bank (the stigma associated with accessing central bank standing facilities in the recent crisis is illustrative). 8 In functional form, the reputation risk is expressed by,
Next, the additional impact of the (systemic and idiosyncratic) second round effects on banks is determined by E 2 , 8 Equation 7 has been calibrated on the actual outcomes of the individual banks and on the share of the reputational effect in the total second round effect (see section 4). If s = 1 (the downside restriction for s), than the mitigating reaction of a bank will not be counteracted by adverse reputational effects and will improve a banks' liquidity position by definition. with w_sim 2,i being replaced by w_sim* 2,i in case of a reacting bank which also faces reputation risk.
The liquidity buffer after the second round effects (B 3 ) is, 
Impact different scenario rounds
The stylised balance sheet in Table B of the Annex shows how the model works in a simplified one bank situation. A hypothetical scenario is assumed to affect all liquid assets and liabilities of the bank through fixed in stead of simulated stressed weights. Furthermore, it is assumed that the first round effect of the scenario leads to a decline of the initial liquidity buffer that exceeds the threshold θ and that the bank reacts with all instruments available at its disposal (i.e. asset items 1 and 2 and liability items 1 and 2 on the stylised balance sheet). This example shows that the mitigating actions of the bank improves its liquidity buffer (to B 2 ), although it remains below the initial level (B 0 ). The second round effects reduce the buffer further (to B 3 ), below the level after the first round shock (B 1 ).
In the stochastic mode of the model, each round of a scenario has its typical effect on the distribution of buffer outcomes. Simulations with real bank data show that the first round effect leads to a shift of the distribution to the left (B 1 ), while the mitigating actions shift the distribution (B 2 ) back towards B 0 and cause a peakening of the shape (Figure 4b 
Parameter sensitivity
Based on the same stylised balance sheet in Table B Table 2 shows the impact of changing each parameter in isolation on the banks' liquidity buffer, in terms of deviations of the final buffer (B 3 ) from the initial buffer (B 0 ). At first sight the model outcomes look relatively sensitive to changes of s (the buffer declines by nearly 2/3 if s = 3) and less to changes in the number of reacting banks and the similarity of reactions (the sensitivity analysis affirms that the latter has a stronger effect on markets than the number of reacting banks). As explained in section 3.5, s reinforces the effects of the number of reacting banks and the similarity of reactions and these factors can hardly be assessed in isolation.
Following from equation 7, the impact of reputational risk (due when banks respond to a scenario by mitigating actions) also depends on the level of market stress. Table 2 shows that reputational risk could severely impact on banks in stressed markets. The model outcomes are also quite sensitive to lengthening the scenario horizon; the final buffer declines by ¼ if the horizon is lengthened from 1 to reactions, the level of market stress and the length of the scenario horizon.
Results
This
Banking crisis scenario
The first round of the hypothetical banking crisis scenario seizes at the liability side of banks' balance sheets. It assumes a public crisis of confidence affecting the banking sector, which could result from massive misselling of a financial product in the retail market. This scenario leads to a withdrawal of non-bank deposits and other funding by professional money market players, other institutional investors and corporates and by withdrawals of savings deposits by households. These first round effects are simulated by stressing the weights of the affected deposits and funding sources (through w_sim 1,i ). These weights determine the first round effect (E 1 ) according to equation 2 and the liquidity buffer (B 1 ) according to equation 3. Table 3 shows the average outcomes for the 82 banks. On average, the first round effect erases 8% of the initial liquidity buffer. Some small banks would be faced with a negative liquidity buffer after the first round of the scenario. Table 3 shows that in case of 30 banks, the decline of the liquidity buffer exceeds the threshold θ = 0.4 which triggers them to restore their liquidity buffer to the initial level (B 0 ). 11 The reactions mitigate the first round effect of the scenario on the sector as a whole to around 7% on average (B 2 being 0.5% smaller than B 0 ). Figure A. 3 in the Annex indicates that smaller banks tend to react relatively more than large banks, which indicates that an outflow of deposits would foremost bring small banks in a critical liquidity position.
In the second round of the scenario it is assumed that banks react to the funding pressures by Table 3 shows that due to the second round effects the banks additionally loose 6% of their initial liquidity buffers on average (including the effects of mitigation actions). Table 3 also shows the 5% and 1% tail outcomes of the final liquidity buffer and the probability of a liquidity shortfall (i.e. B 3 < 0). Insight in the extreme tail outcomes is particularly relevant for financial stability analysis which assesses the resilience of the system to extreme, but plausible shocks. In the 5% (1%) tail the liquidity buffer declines by 26% (32%) on average. Out of the total sample, 25 banks have a probability larger than 0% to end up with a liquidity shortage. These are mostly small banks which explains that the (by the initial liquidity buffer)
weighted average probability of a liquidity shortfall is limited to 0.5%. The latter is an indicator of the liquidity risk of the financial system as a whole. Figure A .5 in the Annex indicate a significant negative correlation between the shortfall probability and size of banks, which affirms that small banks are most vulnerable to a 'classical' banking crisis scenario.
Credit crisis scenario
The first round of the credit crisis scenario seizes at the asset side of banks' balance sheets. It is designed by assuming declining values of banks' tradable credit portfolios, due to uncertainties about the asset valuations which cause a drying up of market liquidity. The falling collateral values lead to higher margin requirements on banks' derivative positions. These first round effects are simulated by stressing the weights of the credit portfolios and margin requirements (through w_sim 1,i ). Table 3 shows the average outcome for the 82 banks. On average, the first round effect erases 13% of the initial liquidity buffer, with a maximum of 92% for the bank that is most severely affected. Although most banks would be affected by the scenario (i.e. is no significant correlation with bank size). Although a more diversified funding profile in general improves banks' resilience to liquidity shocks, the fact that the recent crisis has been most felt in the international financial markets has raised the vulnerability of banks that rely on wholesale funding, next to retail deposits. This underscores that liquidity risk management should identify and measure the full range of liquidity risks which banks could face. Table 3 shows that in case of 33 banks, the decline of the liquidity buffer exceeds the threshold θ = 0.4 which triggers them to restore their liquidity buffer to the initial level (B 0 ). The reactions mitigate the first round effect of the scenario on the sector as a whole to around 3% on average (B 2 being 3% smaller than B 0 ). Figures A.9 and A.10 in the Annex indicate that larger banks with a more diversified funding structure tend to react relatively more than smaller banks, which relates to the stronger first round impact on the former group. According to the model (equation 6), the responses of the large banks potentially have a relatively strong impact on the markets. If threshold θ is doubled to 0.8 than only 13 banks would respond to the first round impact. Table 3 shows that this would limit the second round effects of the scenario, indicating the models' sensitivity to behavioural reactions. In particular the tail outcomes of the buffers are more favourable if fewer banks would react.
The second round of the scenario designed by assuming that the market illiquidity spills over into strained funding liquidity of the banks. Like in the recent credit crisis we assume that the difficulties to roll-over asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) imply an increased probability that off balance liquidity facilities are drawn. This looming liquidity need induces banks to hoard liquidity.
Moreover, higher perceived counterparty risks induce banks to withdraw their promised credit lines.
This contributes to dislocations in the unsecured interbank market. The increased counterparty risk among banks worsens their access to funding in the bond and commercial paper markets. Moreover, collective actions of banks (e.g. fire sales of assets) in response to the first round effect of the scenario could further disrupt credit and stock markets and raise margin calls. These second round effects (w_sim 2,i ) are simulated by further stressing the weights of the credit portfolios and margin requirements (on top of the first round effects) and by stressing the weights of the equity portfolios, unsecured interbank assets and liabilities, capital market liabilities and off balance liquidity committments. The reputation risk of the reacting banks translates into additional (idiosyncratic) stress on the weights (w_sim* 2,i ) according to equation 7. Table 3 shows that the second round effects of the scenario have a larger impact than the first round effects; the banks additionally loose 26% of their initial liquidity buffers on average (including the effects of mitigation actions). A break down of the total second round effect indicates that more than half of the second round effects on the banks which react is caused by the idiosyncratic reputational effects. Several banks loose over 100% of their initial liquidity buffer which means that they become illiquid. Table 3 also shows the 5% and 1% tail outcomes of the final liquidity buffer for each bank and the probability of a liquidity shortfall (i.e. B 3 < 0). In the 5% (1%) tail the liquidity buffer declines by 68% (83%) on average. Out of the total sample, 33 banks have a probability larger than 0% to end up with a liquidity shortage. Figures A.11 and A.12 in the Annex indicate no significant correlation between the shortfall probability and size or funding diversification of banks, indicative of the systemic dimension of the second round effects, that affect all types of banks. This underscores that policy initiatives to enhance banks' liquidity buffers could contribute to prevent financial stability risks.
Impact scenario length and market conditions
The recent liquidity crisis has been more prolonged than most banks assume in their liquidity stresstests (FSF, 2008) . These are typically based on a one to two months horizon. The same applies to liquidity frameworks of supervisors, like DNB's liquidity report. Our model allows for lengthening the stress horizon, by including the recognised cash inflows and outflows that fall due after one month as well in the simulations. In fact, the weights of assets and liabilities should also be changed according to the prolonged horizon, but they have not in the simulations as information of appropriate weights for longer horizons is lacking. This implies that the simulation outcomes probably underestimate the full impact of a prolonged horizon. To illustrate the sensitivity of the liquidity buffers for prolonged liquidity stress, we ran the credit crisis scenario at a 6 months horizon. Table 4 shows that lengthening the stress period has a substantial impact on the scenario outcomes, partly because with regard to the sample of Dutch banks the amount of liabilities falling due after one month exceeds the amount of cash inflows. At a 6 months horizon, the final average buffer turns out to be more than 100% lower compared to a 1 month horizon and the 1% tail outcome almost 150% lower. The latter indicates that a prolonged stress horizon has a relatively large impact on the extreme (tail) outcomes.
To illustrate the sensitivity of the model outcomes to changing market conditions, the credit crisis scenario has also been run with parameter value s = 2.0 in stead of s = 1.5. Table 4 shows that such an increase of market wide stress has a comparable impact as lengthening the scenario horizon.
The relatively high probability of a liquidity shortfall indicates that the outcomes are quite sensitive to changing market conditions; raising the level of s has a relatively large impact on the extreme (tail) outcomes. This is conform the intuition that extreme market conditions can severely impact on the liquidity risk profile of banks.
Back-test
As an anecdotal back-test, in Figure 5 the outcomes of the credit crisis scenario are compared to the actual change of the average liquidity buffer of the Dutch banks since July 2007, when the crisis began to unfold. The actual outcomes are rather close to the first round effects of the scenario (excluding mitigating actions), but are substantially smaller than the buffers modelled after the second round. This could indicate that the assumptions in Liquidity Stress-tester are inappropriate, for instance the assumptions that the weights in DNB's liquidity report resemble 0.1% tail events or that the threshold θ for mitigating reactions is 0.4. Another explanation could be that some functional relationships in the model fail to reflect reality, for instance in case of the second round effects.
It could also be the case that the designed scenario is an imperfect replication of the recent crisis. This is amongst others characterised by a re-intermediation of assets by banks which are not able to fund those in the markets. Returning assets could be classified by banks as liquid items on their balance sheets which may distort the actual liquidity position of banks if market liquidity for such assets has dried up. In case of the Dutch banks this has not been a relevant factor since the off balance items are being consolidated in the balance sheet and hence recur in the DNB liquidity report. The difference between the actual and the model outcomes could also indicate that the extent of the recent market stress is not yet fully reflected in banks' balance sheets due to valuation issues. However, the most likely explanation of the differences between the simulation outcomes and actual developments is provided by the expanded liquidity operations of central banks in the money market, which have enabled banks to liquefy eligible collateral (against certain haircuts) for which the market had seized up. By doing so, central banks addressed a market failure, by breaking the loop between market and funding liquidity risk and preventing further market distress (Nikolaou, 2009) . In terms of our model this implies that the value of certain collateral does not fully reflect the second round effects of the market turmoil (which have come to the fore in reduced liquidity and fallen mark-to-market values, in particular for structured credit securities which in some cases is eligible collateral for central bank borrowing). The simulation outcomes on the other hand, are dominated by the adverse second round effects on the liquidity buffers (in the scenario, the central bank facilities are only included implicitly and partially, i.e. for the banks which react through pledging collateral at the central bank). 
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